We consider multiple activities with imperfectly correlated stochastic cash flows and zero operational synergies. These activities may be incorporated separately with their own debt/equity structures, or combined (merged) into a corporation with a single debt/equity structure. In a Modigliani-Miller (1958) setting, there will be no financial synergies and no gains to merging the activities. In the presence of corporate taxes and default costs, mergers can realize substantial positive financial synergies due to reduced risk and the potential for greater leverage, but at the cost of losing separate debt/equity choices and separate limited liability. Closed-form measures of financial synergies of combining activities are developed, using the model of optimal capital structure introduced by Leland (1994) . Characteristics of activities that gain (or lose) from combination are identified. The results have direct application to the optimal scope of the firm, including the desirability of mergers, spinoffs, and off-balance sheet finance.
Introduction
Corporate mergers typically are justified on the basis of positive cash flow synergies that result from the combination of multiple activities. Spin-offs are motivated by the opposite: negative cash flow synergies suggest incorporating different activities into separate firms. Off-balance sheet financing, including joint ventures, equity carve-outs, "project finance", and asset securitization, is indicated when cash flows from ongoing or new activities are more efficiently realized through separate organizations and financing.
1 Thus, the optimal boundaries of the firm-the scope of activities organized within a single corporate structure-will depend upon the impact of these boundaries upon cash flows and hence value.
In a Modigliani-Miller [1958] world without taxes, bankruptcy costs, or agency costs, there will be no purely financial synergies. Capital structure is irrelevant to total firm value. In this world, operational synergies alone (positive or negative) will determine whether multiple activities should be combined or separated.
In a world with taxes, bankruptcy costs, and potential agency problems, it is well known that capital structure can matter. Purely financial synergies may affect the desirability of mergers, spin-offs, or off-balance sheet financing by extant firms. And purely financial effects can also affect the optimal boundaries of startup firms: should an entrepreneur with two or more projects incorporate them as a single firm, or form multiple firms?
Incorporating activities separately allows each to have its appropriate capital structure, with an optimal amount of debt and equity. If the activities are notably different in terms of risks, default costs, and taxes, their optimal leverage ratios may vary significantly. Each firm will have limited liability.
In contrast, a merged firm will have a single leverage ratio. 2 Debt of a merged firm will have a claim to the combined assets of the firm. Equity in the merged firm loses the multiple bankruptcy shelters of activities that are individually incorporated. Countering this financial advantage to separate incorporation is the fact that, when activities' cash flows are imperfectly correlated, risk can be lowered via a merger or initial consolidation. Given current leverage, lower risk will reduce expected default costs and interest expense. Leverage can then be increased with consequent tax benefits.
This paper examines the purely financial effects of incorporating multiple activities jointly or separately. 4 Closed-form solutions provide quantitative estimates of the magnitude of financial synergies, as well as identifying the organizational and capital structures that maximize these synergies.
Our results show how the separate activities' growth rates, risks, and correlations affect optimal organizational structure. Also important are the costs of financial distress or bankruptcy, corporate income tax rates, and default-free interest rates. While operational synergies often dominate financial synergies in mergers or spin-offs, financial synergies can be sizable in situations that are identified in this paper. 5 For example, new stand-alone projects, or current activities such as contracted payment colle ctions, may have few operational synergies with other existing activities. Financial considerations may be the principal determinant of the choice to use off-balance sheet structures for these activities.
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A model of cash flow valuation and optimal capital structure is needed to estimate the direction and magnitude of financial synergies. Recent work by Leland [1994] , Leland and Toft [1996] , and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland [2001] provide closed-form valuation and capital structure tools.
These tools, appropriately extended, provide the analytical underpinnings for this paper.
Previous Work
A number of previous studies have suggested the importance of purely financial effects in mergers. Lewellen (1971) argued that combining imperfectly correlated assets, while not in itself value-enhancing, has a coinsurance effect: it reduces the risk of default, and it increases the debt capacity of the multi-asset firm. Our model quantifies the coinsurance effect and derives the 5 Evidence suggests that realized operational synergies are modest. Using a sample of 2000 mergers from 1973 -1998 , Andrade, Mitchell, and Stratford (2001 extend results of Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) . They find that post-merger operating margins (the ratio of cash flows to sales) improve by an average of about one percent relative to the corresponding industry median, over the period one year before the merger to one year after. An earlier study by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) concluded that target firm profitably actually fell after mergers. Their study, however, did not make comparisons with an industry control group. 6 Recent experience suggests "cooking the books" as a consideration in some off-balance sheet financing. Our results demonstrate the potential value of legitimate use of these vehicles.
range of parameters for which it is sufficiently important to overcome the disadvantage of forcing a single financial structure onto multiple assets. Shah and Thakor (1987) consider separate incorporation, a characteristic feature of both spin-offs and project finance. Separate incorporation is desirable in their model if creditors have lower screening costs when evaluating separate projects, which in turn permits greater leverage. Our results do not depend on asymmetric information or screening costs, although leverage differences play a key role. Chemmanur and John (1996) also consider spin-offs and project financing. They do not develop quantitative measures, although their qualitative conclusions in many cases are similar to ours:
Spin-offs are relatively more valuable when the cash flows of the separated entities are positively correlated, and projects which are far apart in growth rates should be separated. Their paper has many of the same objectives as this paper, but the results are driven by maximization of control benefits. Debt is used solely for the purpose of maintaining control. Our results are driven by the more traditional objective of equity value maximization, inclusive of the net benefits of financial leverage. Flannery, Houston, and Venkataraman (1993) consider investors who must issue external debt and equity to invest in risky projects, and also must decide upon separate or joint incorporation of the projects. While their conclusion that joint incorporation is more valuable when project returns are less positively correlated and volatilities are similar coincides with the results below, their model has many differences. It is a one period model with no bankruptcy, and does not consider the optimal capital structure for either the separate or merged firms. In contrast, values of the optimally-leveraged firms (separate or combined) drives our conclusions.
Other theoretical papers in this area include John and John (1991) , John (1993) , and Li and Li (1996) . Their modeling, treatment of leverage, and focus on agency costs is also quite different, although many of their qualitative conclusions are similar. Li and Li (1996) assume that changes of the scope of the firm that increase leverage will force managers to pay out free cash flows without foregoing prof itable investment projects. Optimal leverage in their model balances the agency costs of under-investment and over-investment. Their model assumes a single period, normally distributed cashflows, and riskless debt.
Our approach is simpler than most of this recent work. We abstract from agency costs and asymmetric information, and focus exclusively on the effects of optimal capital structure(s) in a world with taxes and default costs. A benefit of simplicity is that quantitative as well as qualitative conclusions can be reached. Yet many of our qualitative results are similar to those reached by previous authors, although the motivations are quite different.
The Model

Individual Activities' Cash Flows and Values
Consider two separate firms generating cash flows ("EBIT" X i (t), i = {1,2}, where
with µ i the (constant) instantaneous risk-adjusted expected growth rate of the cash flow, i.e. the drift rate under the risk neutral measure 7 , σ i is the (constant) volatility of the growth rate, dZ i is the increment to a joint Brownian motion with (constant) correlation ρ, i.e.
. ) (
Extending this notation beyond two dimensions is straightforward.
We assume a riskless asset exists with a constant rate of return r. Under these assumptions, Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) show that the total value to all claimants (including the government) of the cash flows at time t will be (3)
The value of the unlevered firm, after paying corporate income taxes, will be given by
where T i is the effective tax rate for the firm i. 8 Observe that the payout rate (dividends and coupons, assuming the entire after-tax cash flow is distributed) on this market value will be (X i ) is the value of a marketed security, its dynamics under the risk-neutral measure are given by Ito's Lemma, with 
The merged firm with no operating synergies
If the activities of each separate firm were combined into a single firm with no operating synergies, the cash flow X M of the merged firm satisfies 8 We assume a constant corporate tax rate applied to all levels of X i (t) ≥ 0 when there is no corporate debt. More complex modeling would allow for nonlinear tax schedules, e.g. as in Leland (1994 Leland ( , 1998 .
The dynamics of
is not a diffusion process with constant instantaneous mean and variance. From Ito's lemma,
are stochastic for τ ≥ t, both the drift and volatility terms of (9) are stochastic. Thus we cannot extend the valuation formula (3) to this setting. Numerical methods are required and comparative statics cannot be provided.
Nonetheless, we can get closed-form solutions, and general comparative statics, by looking at a closely related case. This case is characterized by the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1 (No Operational Cash Flow Synergies at time of merger):
At the time of the merger τ = t, there are no operational cash flow synergies: 
where the weights w i (t) are given by
Observe that the weights used in (13) and (14) At the time of the merger (τ = t) there zero value synergies from operations, i.e.
where the first line follows from equation (3) and Assumption 2, the second line follows from Assumption 1, the third line from using the definition of µ M in Assumption 3 (with simplification), and the last line from equation (3).
Proposition 1 shows that the construction of the drift term (13) is "natural", in that the value of the merged activities' operational cash flows will equal the sum of values of the separate activities' cash flows. Any other weighting of the individual drifts, for example by relative cash flows rather than by relative values, will lead to positive or negative value changes at the time of merger. Equation (13) also implies that the drift of the combination's value following the merger equals the drift of the sum of the activities' values just prior to the merger. Since (14) is the volatility of the sum of the in dividual activities' values at the time of the merger, it too is the natural candidate for the subsequent volatility of the combination.
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Appendix A compares the distribution of future merged-firm value that follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift and volatility given by (13) and (14), with the distribution of future values resulting from the sum of the two firm values, each following its own geometric Brownian motion. As noted, this sum will not be a geometric Brownian motion. We conclude there that the assumption of a single geometric Brownian for the merged firm value offers a close approximation to default probabilities and the benefits of leverage when the actual stochastic process is the sum of the separate firm values, even for long horizons.
Proposition 2: (No After-tax Value Synergies)
Given assumptions 1, 2, 3, and
there are no after-tax value synergies, i.e.
The proof is immediate by substitution, using (4), (13), and (17). Thus the appropriate weights for the value-neutral tax of a combination are the same weights (13) that determine µ M . Also note that the drift of V M is the same as the drift of F M and X M , i.e. µ M , and the payout rate is δ M = r -µ M . 10 In a portfolio setting, our assumption is equivalent to combining two separate assets and subsequently managing the portfolio by rebalancing to constant asset proportions. (In our model, constant weights w i (τ) = w i (t), for all τ ≥ t, implies a management strategy subsequent to merger that transfers assets between activities to redress deviations in the relative values of activities). For a comparison of the returns of constant-proportions strategies vs. buy-and-hold (the equivalent of equation (7)), see Cox and Leland (2001) . Also, see the discussion in Appendix A.
Optimal Capital Structure for Separate and Merged Activities
We adopt the environment assumed by Leland (1994) . Firms (indexed i = 1,2,M) are described by the following variables:
after-tax value of operational cash flows at time τ.
α i fractional costs to after-tax value V i in the event of default, 
total value of firm at time τ with debt paying coupon rate C i ,
value of equity at time τ,
value of after-tax operational cash flows at which firm defaults.
When the bankruptcy value V B i (C i ) is determined endogenously, Leland (1994) derives closedform expressions for the optimal financial structure of the firm. (Optimized variables are starred.)
11 From equation (6) and following, observe that the drift in V i is the same as the drift of cash flows. 12 Recall from equation (6) and following, the payout rate δ i = r -µ i . where
Since by Proposition 2, V 1 + V 2 = V M , purely financial synergies will be positive (negative) if and only if v M * > v 1 * + v 2 *, i.e. the optimally leveraged merged firm has greater value than the sum of the optimally-leveraged separate firms.
Measuring Financial Synergies
Financial synergies can be measured in a number of ways. An obvious measure is Measure 1. The percentage increase in total firm value:
When a firm seeks to acquire another firm, competition may induce it to bid an amount that reflects total synergies, including financial synergies. 13 This suggests that an alternative measure of financial synergies is Measure 2. The percentage increase in value of the acquired firm:
We adopt the convention that firm 1 is the acquiring firm, realizing none of the benefits, and firm 2 is the acquired firm, realizing all the benefits of the merger. Thus measure 2 is the percentage premium over current value of firm 2 that firm 1 could pay, due solely to financial synergies.
Clearly Measure 2 always exceeds Measure 1 in absolute value.
A final measure considers the case of an optimally-leveraged target firm. It is assumed that all benefits will accrue to the stockholders of the levered firm.
Measure 3. The percentage increase in equity value of the acquired firm:
Section 6 introduces a base case and determines financial synergies using these three measures.
Section 7 considers the effect of parametric changes on financial synergies, when assumption 2 (equal tax rates) holds. Section 8 considers differential tax effects.
Comparative Statics with Equal Tax Rates
Base Case 1: Symmetric Firms
Base Case 1 assumes two symmetric firms, identical in size and in the nature of their cash flows, but imperfectly correlated. The objective is to determine the magnitude of financial synergies for a merger of equals, and then see how these synergies depend on the firms' correlation, drift, volatility, tax rate, and default costs. Table 1 lists parameters for Base Case 1.
These parameters are chosen to approximate a "typical" large firm, with correlation near the historical average between typical stocks. Default costs fall within a range of recent empirical estimates. 14 The net tax rate of 20% reflects both the corporate income tax rate and the tax advantage of equity. 15 Total payouts (to stock and bondholders) are assumed to be 6% of unlevered market value (V). For this base case, we calculate the entries in Table 2 , using the formulas from Leland (1994) above.
14 Anderson and Betker (1995) estimate a median α = 34.7%, and Gilson (1997) estimates α = 45.3%. Andrade and Kaplan (1998) suggest a range of default costs from 10% to 20%, based on studies of firms undergoing highly leveraged takeovers (HLTs). However, firms subject to HLTs are likely to have lowerthan-average default costs, since high leverage will only be optimal for firms with this characteristic. 15 See Leland (1996) for a calculation of the 20% net tax rate. Financial synergies are positive, and of reasonable magnitude. Measure 3, which always yields the highest value, indicates that Firm 1 could make an offer for Firm 2's equity at a premium exceeding 8 percent, based purely on financial synergies. But as measured relative to the total value (debt and equity) of the two firms, Measure 1, the value increase from financial synergies is 1.38 percent. We now consider the sensitivity of the three benefit measures to changes in the parameters, still assuming the merged firms are symmetric. Perhaps the single most important parameter is the correlation ρ between the individual firms' cash flows. Figure 1 examines the financial benefits to merger as a function of correlation.
Observe that the financial benefits decline from about 2% for Measure 1 (11% for Measure 3) to zero, as correlation increases from zero to one. (Benefits would be even higher if cash flows were negatively correlated). Note financial benefits are never negative in this base case, because the separate firms are symmetric and there is no advantage to having differing leverage ratios through separate incorporation. 16 It is assumed that the debt of the separate companies is called at par (equal to market value) at the time of the merger, and new debt is subsequently issued by the merged firm. Thus, old and new bondholders realize no gains or losses from the merger. 17 As suggested by Huang and Huang [2002] , actual spreads over treasuries may be higher, reflecting liquidity differences and other factors. Figure 2 examines the impact of changes in the risk-adjusted growth rate of cash flows, µ. Figure   2 also reflects changes in the payout rate, recalling that the payout rate equals the risk free rate less the growth rate. Observe that merger benefits increase as the risk-neutral growth rate increases. With the lower payouts that are implied by higher growth rates, greater leverage can be undertaken, and the resulting benefits to mergers are larger. Figure 3 considers the effect of volatility σ changes on merger benefits, for Base Case 1. Here, the measures behave differently. The financial benefits relative to total value (Measure 1) and Firm 2 value (Measure 2) reach a peak at a volatility σ = 6%. These measures are maximized for a relatively low volatility of the separate firms. Higher volatility hurts these measures because leverage must be reduced; lower volatility reduces them because the benefits to diversification are relatively small as a fraction of firm value. Measure 3 rises monotonically as volatility falls. This is because the extreme leverage permitted by very low volatility reduces the denominator of Measure 3, firm 2 equity value, even more rapidly than the numerator, financial benefits. declines because leverage declines with α, thereby increasing equity value (the denominator) more rapidly than the benefits.
Base Case 2: Asymmetric Firms
We now consider how differences in firms' characteristics will affect potential financial synergies. Recall that if firms (or activities) are quite different, it may be advantageous to keep them as separate firms. This is because the capital structures can be attuned to these differences.
Indeed, the chie f rationale for project financing is to allow financing that is separate from the parent organization.
Base Case 2 considers firms that differ according to the optimal leverage that might be utilized.
Firm 1 is assumed to be a "mature" firm, with relatively modest growth, risk, and default costs.
Firm 2 is a smaller firm with high growth, high risk, and sizable default costs. Base Case 2 parameters are listed in Table 3 .
Just as we applied value weights to the individual drift rates to determine the drift rate of the merged firm, we apply value weights to the individual default cost fractions to determine the default cost fraction of the merged firm. Notice the substantial difference in the initial capital structures of the two firms. The optimal leverage and implied recovery rate for Firm 1 are considerably higher than for Firm 2, which has both high volatility and high default costs. Despite these differences, there are still positive financial synergies to merging the firms, due to the lower risk created through diversification.
But the synergies become negative when the correlation increases, as seen in Figure 6 :
Separation is preferred to merger whenever ρ > 0.61.
The effect of different growth rates of Firm 2 on the benefits of merging is shown in Figure 7 .
For growth rates less than 1.4%, we observe that merger is undesirable. As payouts of the target firm are lower, and risk-adjusted growth is higher, the advantage to merging increases. This result suggests that high-growth firms may be desirable candidates for acquisition by mature firms for financial synergies. Figure 8 relates benefits of merging to the volatility of the target firm (Firm 2). An interesting pattern is noted: for low volatilities (σ 2 < 5%), the financial benefits of combination are negative. Such activities should be structured separately. This seems consistent with many asset securitization choices, which involve relatively low risk cash flows.
A maximum total benefit (Measure 1) is reached at approximately σ 2 = 23%. The maximum of Measure 3 is reached at a lower volatility, approximately σ 2 = 14%. Around this range of volatilities, activities should be combined.
For higher volatilities, the advantage to merger diminishes, and very high-risk activities (σ 2 ≥ 50%) should again remain as independent activities. This result is robust to changes in other Firm 2 parameters-even when default costs fall to 10%, a merger is undesirable when σ 2 exceeds about 50%. And if the project or activity (i.e., Firm 2) is of a size equal to Firm 1, it should remain separate when σ 2 exceeds about 38%. This conclusion coincides with the observation that project finance (with separate incorporation) is often used for large projects with high risk.
18 Figure 8A considers financial synergies as a function of target firm risk, for the situation where Firm 1 has higher volatility (σ 1 = 20%) rather than 10%. Observe that the ranges for spinoffs or off-balance sheet financing shift upwards. Separation is desirable when σ 2 < 18% or σ 2 > 70%. Figure 9 examines the sensitivity of financial synergies to default costs of Firm 2, α 2 . Measures 1 and 2 reach a peak at around α 2 = 40%; Measure 3 reaches a peak at about α 2 = 15%, again due to the increase in leverage (and decline in the equity value of Firm 2) as default costs fall. For the entire range of α 2 (zero to one) in Base Case 2, a merger of the firms is desirable. With higher correlation of cash flows, either high or low default costs of Firm 2 will make separation preferred. These results are relatively insensitive to α 1 , the default costs of Firm 1.
The results from Base Case 2 have assumed that the default costs of the merged firm are a valueweighted average of the individual activities' default costs. If default costs of the merged firm are lower (higher), there will be a corresponding increase in the financial benefits (costs) of merger. For example, in Base Case 2, if default costs of the merged firm are the same as those of the acquiring Firm 1 (20% rather than 32%), there will be financial benefits of (1.44%, 7.78%, 11.62%) under Measures (1, 2, 3), in comparison with the Base Case of (0.66%, 3.54%, 5.28%).
Thus substantial additional financial synergies are available when default costs of the merged firm are lower than the "value neutral" level . Figure 10 considers the case where the tax rate of Firm 2 (T 2 ) varies. We make one change in presenting the results in Figure 10 . Previously, as we changed Firm 2 parameters in Base Case 2, the pre-tax and post-tax ratio of Firm 1 value to Firm 2 value remained at 25%. Now, if we keep pre-tax values at a 25% ratio, the after-tax or market value of the unlevered cash flows of Firm 2 will decrease as the tax rate T 2 increases, both absolutely and relative to Firm 1. The "target" firm becomes smaller in relative market value as the tax rate increases.
To keep the relative market value of Firm 2 constant, we must increase the value of unlevered pre-tax cash flows as T 2 increases. This is done in the calculations for Figure 10 , where (as in Base Case 2) the market value of Firm 2 is kept at 25% of the market value of Firm 1.
For very low tax rates, the activities should remain separate. Benefits occur to merging the activities when tax rates exceed 11%. Measure 1 reaches a maximum of 2.30% at a tax rate of 62%. Measure 2 reaches a maximum of 9.40% at a tax rate of 52%. Measure 3 reaches a maximum of 42.33% at a tax rate of 72%. Obviously, higher-tax environments tend to encourage mergers, and a larger scope to firms.
The above analysis assumes a tax rate for the merged firm that is "value neutral" (as defined in equation (16)). If the tax rate for the merged firm is less (more), there will be greater (lesser) financ ial synergies to the merger. For example, in Base Case 2, if the tax rate of the merged firm falls from 20% to 18%, the benefits to the merger under Measures (1, 2, 3) rise to (1.55%, 8.33%,
12.44%).
The effect of target size (Firm 2 relative to Firm 1) on the desirability of merger or separation is considered in Figure 11 . Measure 1 benefits are maximized when target firm size is approximately 20%, or close to the base case. For Base Case 2 parameters, including high (40%) target volatility, the ideal merger target is quite small relative to the acquiring firm. However, the optimal target size increases as the volatility of the target firm falls. Measure 2 and 3 benefits are larger as the target firm is increasingly small, since the target firm size in the denominator of these measures decreases more swiftly than the benefits in the numerator. Note that financial benefits shift from positive to negative as the target firm becomes larger than about 75% of the acquiring firm. When the correlation between cash flows is 0.60 rather than 0.30, separation is desirable whenever the size of the target exceeds 25% of the acquiring firm.
Conclusions
Financial synergies can affect the optimal scope of the firm-the extent to which separate activities are combined into a single corporation. To examine purely financial synergies, we assume there are zero operational synergies. Mergers, spinoffs, and off-balance sheet financing may still be value-enhancing in the presence of taxes and default costs. Using a simple model of valuation and financial structure based on Leland (1994) and Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001) ,
we examine the optimal scope and financial structure for multiple activities.
Operational variables-the drift, variance, and correlation of cash flows-are important determinants of the firm's scope even when operational synergies do not exist. These variables interact in a complex way with financial variables-tax rates, default costs, and the level of riskfree interest rates-to determine the impact of scope on value.
In all cases, the correlation between activities' cash flows is an important determinant of the desirability of mergers. Low correlation creates substantial financial synergies, because it lowers risk and permits greater leverage. Firms merging "specialized activities" (in the sense of high correlation) typically must justify the combination on the basis of operational synergies, since financial synergies are likely to be small or negative. "Conglomerates" (in the sense of low correlation between activities), on the other hand, can be justified solely on financial synergies.
The purely financial benefits to merging can be quite high, particularly if the measure is in terms of the potential premium that can be paid on the target firm's equity (Measure 3). While for Base
Case scenarios these numbers are modest (5 -7 percent), Measure 3 can rise to well over 10% as correlation falls, growth rates rise, volatility is neither very high nor very low, and tax rates are high (see Figures 1-11) . As a fraction of total pre-merger value (Measure 1), purely financial benefits are relatively small (generally 0.50% -2.00%). However, it should be recalled that empirical studies of total merger benefits fall in this range. 19 Thus, to our knowledge empirical evidence cannot firmly reject the hypothesis that average merger benefits could be explained by entirely by financial synergies. We do not contend that this is the case, however.
In virtually all cases examined, financial synergies will be positive when the leverage of the merged firm is greater than the value-weighted average of the optimal leverage of the separate firms. 20 Our theory suggests, therefore, that financial leverage will increase following mergers. for activities whose risk-adjusted growth rates are low (or equivalently, payouts are high), tax rates are modest, and size is substantial (see Figures 6-11 ). Many of these attributes are possessed by projects or activities that are financed through off-balance sheet means, including low-risk asset securitizations through SPVs/SPEs, and high-risk project finance. 19 For example Stafford, Mitchell, and Andrade (2001) find that the combined abnormal increase in the stock values of acquiring and target firms around the time of merger announcement averages 1.8% over the period . (The denominator here excludes debt. Including debt will reduce the 1.8% figure. ) The authors find that abnormal returns to target firms' equity (Measure 3) average 16%. 20 While true in the majority of cases, there are minor exceptions. And the magnitude of leverage increases is not monotonically related to the net financial benefits (Measure 1). 21 See, for example, Kim and McConnell (1977) and Ghosh and Jain (2000) . We first examine Base Case 1 described in Tables 1 and 2 . The sum of the two values (of EBIT) at the time of merger is 2.00. Figure 12A gives the p.d.f.s (a) and (b) for this case:
22 15 years (≈ 1/r) is the duration of (riskless) infinite-life debt, given a riskfree rate of 7%. Even though the duration of risky debt is shorter, we err on the side of conservatism in using this longer horizon. Note the p.d.f.s look almost identical. However, the red line lies slightly above the blue p.d.f. for low values, and the risk-neutral (cumulative) probability that the sum of values (solid red line) is less than the default value V B = .986 after fifteen years (13.74%) is slightly higher than the corresponding risk-neutral probability (12.95%) for the merged value (dotted blue line). That is, the benefits of leverage determined in Base Case 1 and based on the merged firm's process, reflect a slightly lower risk of default than would be the case if the merged firm's cash flow were actually the sum of the two separate firms' cash flows. This could lead to an overestimate of optimal leverage and the potential benefits of merger.
A way to correct for this is to choose a slightly higher volatility than given by (14) for the merged firm's stochastic process, such that the risk-neutral probability of default (i.e. V ≤ V B ) is the same as for the sum of the separate firms (13.74%). This is achieved by adjusting the annual volatility of the merged process to 15.83%, rather than the 15.49% computed using (14). Since the drift term remains the same, it follows from equation (3) that the value of the firm at the time of merger is not affected by the assumed change in risk.
With the higher risk, the optimal amount of leverage is reduced from 70.1% to 69.8%, and Measure 1 benefits are slightly lower, 1.26% rather than the initially estimated 1.38%. Figure 12B re-plots the p.d.f. of the merged firm (blue dotted line), with the higher volatility that gives equal risk-neutral probabilities of default. A slight leftward-shift can be observed, relative to that in Figure 12A : Figure 13A gives the p.d.f.s equivalent to Figure 12A , for the Base Case 2 considered in Tables 3  and 4 . The sum of the two values of EBIT at the time of merger is 1.25.
Note that the p.d.f. of the merged firms no longer conform almost exactly, reflecting the considerable differences in the firms being merged. Again, the cumulative probability of default at V B = .630 is now slightly higher (7.75%) for the sum of values of the separate firms than the probability computed for the merged firm (7.73%). Increasing the volatility for the merged firm to 12.92% (from 12.90%) gives an equal risk-neutral probability of default (7.75%). With the higher volatility, optimal leverage for the merged firm falls from 68.9% to 68.8%, and the Measure 1 benefits to merger fall from an estimated 0.66% to 0.65%. Figure 13B shows the effect of the slight increase in volatility on the p.d.f. of the merged firm. Based on these examples, we conclude that the calculated financial benefits of mergers, based on the geometric (lognormal) value process (12) - (14), provide a close approximation to the benefits that would be derived under the value process of the sum of the (non-lognormal) individual firms' values. Our approximation allows closed-form estimates of these financial benefits.
